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This dissertation is concerned with risk assessment rather than verification methodology. Verification
requiresdetailedsystemmodels,whicharecheckedagainstsafetyrequirements;riskassessmentisacore
activity in obtaining these requirements. Verification is applicable in later phases of the development
process, such as hardwareintheloop simulation [46], or when the system design process has split into
domain specific processes such as software development, in which the task is to determine formal
requirementsandtoensurethesoftwareimplementationsconformancetothoserequirements[47].Much
researchonverificationmethodshasbeenrestricted tocontrol softwarethat isdescribedbysufficiently
formal models, such as SCADE [48], while our goal is to track fault propagation paths that cross the
boundaries of software, electrical and mechanical systems. Recently, verification methods have been
developed to analyze a model consisting of control software and a physical process. An approach
combining Petri nets with differential equations systems to verify systems containing continuous and
discrete dynamics [49]. Another approach combining theorem proving with nonlinear optimization
techniquesisdescribedin[50].

In [49], the verification of the software with Petri nets is done against a differential equation system
describing the nominal characteristics of the physical equipment under control. In simulationbased risk
assessment, thesystemwideeffectofcomponentfailurescanbestudied. IntheFFIPframeworkusedin
thisdissertation[51],itispossibletoinjectcriticaleventstodriveanycomponenttooneofseveralpossible
failure modes. This component’s simulation switches to using set of difference equations capturing the





out its safetyrelated functions in the faceof severalcomponent failures.TheverificationwithPetrinets
performs static analyses of the system model to make sure that software will not reach a state that is





























































































































































































































































Figure 6, Boiling Water Reactor concept design after the introduction of optional pressure sensor information (in bold), 






















































































































Figure 11, Configuration flow graph of the example water cooling process (see Fig. 9) 


Figure 12, Function Failure Logic for the Supply liquid material (Radiator) function, which is related to the Radiator 




























































Figure 16, A flowchart describing how every combination of parameter values is simulated systematically to determine 





Figure 17, The radiator liquid level result of performing the procedure in Fig. 16 when parameter 1 is 
RefInputLiquidFlow and parameter 2 is leakSize. The level drop due to the leak flow does not depend on the reference flow 
through the radiator. It only depends on the liquid level in the radiator and the size of the leak.  


Figure 18, The cooler temperature result of performing the procedure in Fig. Flowchart_alt when parameter 1 is 
RefInputLiquidFlow and parameter 2 is leakSize. The worst behaviour is for the combination of the smallest reference flow 





Table 1, The output of Function Failure Logic for the simulation in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18. In parenthesis is the simulation 







































































Figure 21, The Configuration Flow Graph top level model in Simulink, related to the functional model of the BWR in Fig. 
19,  adapted from [103] 







Table 2, Mappings between functions of the functional model in Fig. 19 and components of the Configuration Flow Graph 










































Figure 24, Functional Failure Logic that determines the health of the transmit thermal energy function (Fig. 19) related to 
the FuelRods component in Fig 22 [103] 

Figure 25, Functional Failure Logic that determines the health of the transport thermal energy function (Fig. 19) related 











































Figure 27, Behaviour at reactor core when power supply and pressure control malfunction occur at t=40. Volumetric flow 










































Figure 28,  Propagation of functional failures displayed on the functional model of the BWR (Fig. 19), displaying the 




















Figure 29,  Fuel rods temperature in 8 simulation runs with different sequencing of injected failures. TimeInterval = 































Figure 31, Fuel rod temperature results when different values for the Heat Transfer Coefficient (HTC) design parameter 
are used. Temperature values above 5.5 are considered not healthy by the Functional Failure Logic (Fig. 24) related to the 


















Figure 32, Algorithm for generating the parameter combinations for executing FFIP simulation runs, a refinement of the 



















Figure 33, Temperature of fuel rods in simulations resulting in healthy FFL verdicts. The three curves for HTC=8 and 
RailFailDelay=70 (for the three values of the RampSlope parameter) were overlapping and visually indistinguishable on the 

























































Figure 36, The internals of the CoolantPumps component of Fig. 22. Alternative behavioural models have been added to 









Figure 37, Configuring a valid product instance using FeatureIDE’s configurator 


Figure 38, Extension developed for FeatureIDE’s configurator for the exports of a Matlab script (Fig, 39) that can 











Figure 40, Fuel rod temperature results for different alternative design configurations. Temperature values above 5.5 are 










Table 4, Results of the Functional Failure Logic (Fig. 24) for the results presented in Fig, 40. In parenthesis is the total 









Figure 41, The decay algorithm for the coolant pumps behaviour is rejected if pressure sensor information is not available 




















Figure 42, The presence of pressure sensor information leads to acceptable system response to the critical event scenario 
(see the functional health results in Table 4) for the configurations including the Decay feature. These are the results when 
the pressure information comes from the reactor vessel. If there is a pressure sensor on the pipeline before the pressure 

















Figure 43, The Step algorithm for the coolant pumps behaviour fails if there is no pressure sensor information [106] 


Figure 44, The inclusion of pressure sensor information cannot lead to acceptable system response to the critical event 










Figure 45, Feature model after the risk assessment of the design alternatives. Compared to Fig. 34 the Step feature is 
removed and the constraint that the Decay feature requires the presence of pressure information from either the reactor 









































Figure 48, Unconfigured Structured Text code in CoDeSys for the main Program Organization Unit of the control 


















































































Figure 50, A tool that was developed to add the constraints information of the feature model in Fig. 7 into an “enhanced” 











Figure 51, A tool that was developed to help the user to configure a software product instance, validate it against the 









Figure 52, Flowchart of the algorithm used in the tool in Fig. 51, that validates the user choices against the feature model 
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